J.1-

BEFORE THE 1 POLLUTION CONTROL HEARINGS BOARD STATE OF WASHINGTON 2 IN THE MATTER OF 3 U.S. OIL AND REFINING COMPANY, 4 Appellant, 5 PCHB No. 78-201 v. 6 ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR STATE OF WASHINGTON 7 SUMMARY JUDGMENT DEPARTMENT OF ECOLOGY. 8 Respondent. 9

Motions for Summary Judgment were filed by appellant and respondent, and a hearing thereon was conducted on February 5, 1979, before the Pollution Control Hearings Board, Dave J. Mooney, Chairman, Chris Smith and David Akana (presiding), at its office in Lacey.

Appellant was represented by Charles W. Lean, Assistant Attorney General; respondent was represented by its attorney, Ray Graves.

Having considered the Motions, the supporting affidavits, the memoranda submitted, and the file and record herein, the Board concludes that the Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted in

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|favor of respondent.

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The matter placed before the Board and which is dispositive of this case involves a question of law as to whether six penalties imposed by respondent were barred by the applicable statute of limitations. There appears a conflict between two statutes:

RCW 4.16.010 provides in part.

"Actions can only be commenced within the periods herein prescribed after the cause of action shall have accrued, except when in special cases a different limitation is prescribed by statute; . . . "

RCW 4.16.100 then provides.

"Within two years:

. . . .

(2) An action upon a statute for a forfeiture or penalty to the state. [Code 1881 § 29; 1877 p 8 § 29; 1869 p 9 § 29; 1854 p 363 § 5; RRS § 160.]

On the other hand RCW 4.16.160 provides that:

The limitations prescribed in this chapter shall apply to actions brought in the name or for the benefit of any county or other municipality or quasimunicipality of the state, in the same manner as to actions brought by private parties: Provided, That there shall be no limitation to actions brought in the name or for the benefit of the state, and no claim of right predicated upon the lapse of time shall ever be asserted against the state. And further provided, That no previously existing statute of limitations shall be interposed as a defense to any action brought in the name or for the benefit of the state, although such statute may have run and become

^{1.} The days in question were May 10, 11, 12, 15, July 1 and August 29 of 1975. The order imposing a penalty for each day was issued on May 19, 1978. Appellant has withdrawn all grounds for appealing the violations except its statute of limitation contention. Both parties agreed that the sole remaining issue is whether any statute of limitation bars the \$30,000 in civil penalties imposed for the six violations

1 2 3	fully operative as a defense prior to February 27, 1903, nor shall any cause of action against the state be predicated upon such a statute. [1955 c 43 § 2. Prior. 1903 c 24 § 1; Code 1881 § 35; 1873 p 10 §§ 34, 35; 1869 p 10 §§ 34, 35, 1854 p
4	364 § 9; RRS § 167, part.] (Emphasis added.)
5	Assuming for purposes of these motions that the "action" accrued on the
6	dates indicated, we are persuaded that RCW 4.16.160 removes the "state"
7	from the two year limitation of RCW 4.16.100(2). Accordingly, we
8	hold that no statute of limitation bars these civil penalties. IT IS
9	THEREFORE ORDERED that appellant's Motion for Summary Judgment is denied
10	and respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.
11	DATED thisday of February, 1979.
12	POLLUTION CONTROL HEARINGS BOARD
13 14	DAVEJ. MOONLY, Chairman
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17	CHRIS SMITH, Member
18	David aleana
19	DAVID AKANA, Member
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ORDER ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT